


The US Tariff Tracker follows major 2025–2026 U.S. trade-policy actions, including the end of IEEPA-based tariff duties, the temporary Section 122 import surcharge, Section 232 sector tariffs, de minimis changes, and new Section 301 investigations.
U.S. tariff policy changed rapidly across 2025 and 2026. The administration began by using emergency powers under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, or IEEPA, to impose broad duties on imports from Mexico, Canada, China, and later many trading partners under the reciprocal tariff framework.
That legal foundation changed on February 20, 2026, when the U.S. Supreme Court held that IEEPA does not authorize the President to impose tariffs. In response, the administration ended the IEEPA-based additional ad valorem duties and shifted toward other legal tools, including Section 122, Section 232, and Section 301.
For importers, exporters, freight forwarders, customs brokers, retailers, manufacturers, and e-commerce sellers, this means the tariff landscape is still highly active. The broad IEEPA tariff framework no longer applies, but other measures remain in force or under development:
This tracker consolidates major U.S. tariff and trade-policy actions through early July 2026. It is designed to help trade, sourcing, compliance, customs, and logistics teams understand what is in force, what has ended, what is proposed, and what may affect landed-cost planning.
| Country / Scope | Type & Status | Ad Valorem Rate | Exemptions & Notes | Announced Countermeasures |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| All imports | Section 122 temporary import surcharge – Implemented | 10% | Effective February 24, 2026, for 150 days unless modified, suspended, or extended by Congress. Section 122 allows up to 15%. Does not apply on top of Section 232 duties for the same portion of an import. | Trading partners may challenge or negotiate depending on product exposure. |
| IEEPA-based tariff actions | Ended after Supreme Court decision | No longer collected as IEEPA tariff duties | The February 20, 2026 executive order ended certain additional ad valorem duties imposed under IEEPA, including reciprocal and related emergency tariff duties. | N/A |
| Global de minimis shipments | Duty-free de minimis suspension – Implemented | Full applicable duties now apply | Effective August 29, 2025, low-value shipments that previously qualified under the $800 de minimis threshold are subject to customs treatment and applicable duties. | Postal and parcel operators changed service models and compliance procedures. |
| China | IEEPA reciprocal/fentanyl duties – Ended; Section 301 and Section 232 remain relevant | Varies by measure | IEEPA duties are no longer collected, but China Section 301 duties, exclusions, sector tariffs, and other trade-remedy actions remain important. | China-related negotiations and retaliatory-risk monitoring remain active. |
| China Section 301 exclusions | Extended | N/A | 178 product exclusions from additional China Section 301 duties extended through November 10, 2026. | — |
| China balanced-trade mechanism | Under comment / policy development | Not yet a new tariff rate | USTR requested public comment in June 2026 on a mechanism to promote more balanced and reciprocal trade with China. | China may respond depending on implementation. |
| Forced-labor import-ban investigations | Section 301 – Proposed action | 10% or 12.5% proposed additional duties | USTR proposed action in 60 investigations involving economies that allegedly failed to impose or enforce bans on forced-labor goods. A textile mechanism was also proposed. | Affected economies may respond through consultations or countermeasures. |
| Structural excess capacity | Section 301 – Investigation ongoing | Not yet final | Investigations cover China, the EU, Singapore, Switzerland, Norway, Indonesia, Malaysia, Cambodia, Thailand, Korea, Vietnam, Taiwan, Bangladesh, Mexico, Japan, and India. | Potential countermeasures depend on final findings. |
| Brazil | Section 301 – Determination and proposed action | Not yet final | USTR issued a determination and proposed responsive action in June 2026, with public comment and hearing process in July. | Brazil may negotiate or retaliate depending on final action. |
| Steel and aluminum | Section 232 – Implemented and adjusted | Generally up to 50% | Duties were restored and later expanded. 2026 updates adjusted treatment for steel, aluminum, copper, and derivative products, including certain reduced-duty pathways. | EU and other partners continue to monitor and respond through trade defense tools. |
| Copper | Section 232 – Implemented and adjusted | Generally up to 50% for covered products | Copper duties affect electrical equipment, construction materials, electronics, power infrastructure, and clean-energy supply chains. | Suppliers may adjust sourcing or pricing. |
| Automobiles and auto parts | Section 232 – Implemented | 25% | USMCA-origin content and certain treatment may reduce exposure for qualifying North American production. | Key exporters continue to negotiate treatment. |
| Medium- and heavy-duty trucks and buses | Section 232 – Implemented | 25% on covered medium- and heavy-duty trucks and parts; 10% on buses | Tariff-credit and offset mechanisms apply for certain U.S.-assembled trucks and engines through October 31, 2030. | — |
| Semiconductors and semiconductor manufacturing equipment | Section 232 – Implemented / negotiated | 25% for certain advanced computing chips and derivative products | Exclusions apply for specified uses, including U.S. data centers, repairs, R&D, startups, consumer applications, civil industrial applications, and public-sector use. | Country-specific treatment may depend on agreements. |
| Patented pharmaceuticals and ingredients | Section 232 – Implemented | 100% for covered products | Covered patented pharmaceuticals and associated ingredients face a 100% duty unless an exclusion, agreement, or zero-tariff category applies. | Pharmaceutical exporters may seek agreements or localization strategies. |
| Timber, lumber, and derivative products | Section 232 – Implemented / amended | Varies by product | Tariffs apply to covered wood products, with later amendments affecting scheduled increases and product treatment. | Canada and other wood-product exporters remain highly exposed. |
| Ecuador | Agreement on Reciprocal Trade – Signed | Product-specific schedule | Agreement signed March 13, 2026, with published agreement text and tariff schedule. | Agreement-based treatment depends on implementation. |
| Switzerland and Liechtenstein | Modified tariff treatment | MFN or 15%, whichever is higher | Applied retroactively to November 14, 2025, while framework finalization continued. | — |
| India | Reciprocal-trade framework / negotiations | 18% reciprocal rate referenced in U.S.–India framework | Potential removal for selected goods depends on successful conclusion of the interim agreement and product coverage. | India may seek broader exemptions. |
| Thailand | Reciprocal-trade framework | 19% reciprocal rate referenced in framework | U.S. may identify selected products for zero reciprocal tariff treatment under aligned-partner procedures. | — |
| Japan | U.S.–Japan framework | 15% baseline tariff for many Japanese imports | Separate treatment applies for automobiles, auto parts, aerospace, generic pharmaceuticals, and certain natural resources. | — |
| South Korea | Framework treatment | Country- and sector-specific | U.S. statements reference favorable Section 232 treatment for certain Korean-origin pharmaceuticals and semiconductors. | — |
| Canada and Mexico | IEEPA duties ended; USMCA review ongoing | IEEPA duties no longer collected | USMCA-compliant goods remain central to North American tariff planning, but the July 2026 joint review created new uncertainty because the U.S. did not agree to renew the agreement in its current form. | Canada and Mexico may negotiate changes during review. |
Legal Note: IEEPA-based additional ad valorem tariff duties are no longer the central legal issue after the Supreme Court held that IEEPA does not authorize tariffs. However, Section 232, Section 301, Section 122, antidumping and countervailing duties, and ordinary customs duties remain separate legal authorities. Importers should not assume that the end of IEEPA tariffs removes exposure to all tariff increases.
The administration opened 2025 with executive orders imposing 25% tariffs on imports from Mexico and Canada and 10% tariffs on imports from China under IEEPA. These measures were tied to fentanyl, border security, and national-emergency declarations.
At the time, the measures immediately affected North American sourcing, customs compliance, retail pricing, automotive supply chains, and consumer goods imports. However, the legal basis for these IEEPA tariff actions was later rejected by the Supreme Court in February 2026.
On March 4, 2025, tariff pressure on China increased through fentanyl-related measures. On March 12, 2025, the administration reinstated Section 232 tariffs on steel and aluminum at 25%.
The metals measures affected construction, automotive manufacturing, machinery, appliances, packaging, industrial equipment, and downstream products. Unlike the IEEPA actions, Section 232 tariffs were not eliminated by the Supreme Court decision.
April 2, 2025 marked the launch of the broad reciprocal tariff framework, including a 10% baseline tariff and additional country-specific rates. The administration also removed de minimis treatment for China and Hong Kong low-value imports.
On April 9, 2025, country-specific reciprocal tariff rates were announced. Those reciprocal measures became one of the most important landed-cost issues of 2025, but they were later affected by the February 2026 Supreme Court decision because they had been imposed under IEEPA.
The United States and China entered a temporary de-escalation framework in May 2025. The framework lowered immediate escalation risk while negotiations continued.
For importers, the main takeaway was that China-related rates could shift quickly depending on negotiations, executive orders, and USTR actions. Even when one tariff measure was suspended or delayed, separate Section 301 and Section 232 measures remained relevant.
On June 4, 2025, tariffs on steel and aluminum increased from 25% to 50%. On June 23, 2025, the scope expanded to include additional downstream products such as appliances and industrial machinery.
This was a major cost shock for manufacturers, construction firms, machinery importers, and retailers selling products with high steel or aluminum content.
On August 1, 2025, the copper tariff took effect, affecting electronics, electrical equipment, construction inputs, clean-energy systems, automotive components, and industrial machinery.
On August 29, 2025, the United States ended duty-free de minimis treatment for all countries. This was one of the largest operational changes for e-commerce and small-parcel logistics because shipments valued at $800 or less became subject to full customs processing and applicable duties.
In October 2025, the administration announced plans for additional China tariff escalation and export-control actions. USTR also moved forward with Section 301 measures involving China-linked ship-to-shore cranes, intermodal chassis, and certain cargo-handling equipment, although some maritime-related responsive actions were later suspended.
The White House also issued Section 232 action covering medium- and heavy-duty trucks, key truck parts, and buses, effective November 1, 2025. The measure created tariff-credit and offset mechanisms for certain U.S.-assembled trucks and engines.
The Senate also voted to challenge Brazil-related tariffs, signaling growing congressional pressure on broad unilateral tariff actions.
In early November 2025, the United States and China finalized the Kuala Lumpur Joint Arrangement, which suspended heightened China reciprocal tariff escalation and helped reduce immediate escalation risk.
On November 10, 2025, USTR suspended for one year certain Section 301 ships and maritime responsive actions, including port fees on Chinese-linked vessels and 100% duties on certain ship-to-shore cranes and cargo-handling equipment.
In mid-November, the administration also removed reciprocal duties on more than 200 agricultural and food products not sufficiently produced in the United States. On November 20, 2025, the additional Brazil agriculture tariffs were rolled back, leaving only the baseline reciprocal treatment where applicable at that time.
On December 1, 2025, the Federal Register published the extension of 178 China Section 301 product exclusions through November 10, 2026.
On December 17, 2025, tariff treatment for Switzerland and Liechtenstein was modified retroactively to November 14, 2025. The framework applied the MFN rate or 15%, whichever was higher, while finalization continued.
In late December, China semiconductor measures remained active, but certain new tariff increases were delayed to June 2027. This kept semiconductor tariffs as a live policy lever while avoiding immediate escalation for some chip-related imports.
On January 14, 2026, the White House issued Section 232 action on semiconductors, semiconductor manufacturing equipment, and derivative products. The action included 25% duties on certain advanced computing chips and derivative products, with exclusions for specific U.S.-focused uses such as data centers, repairs, R&D, startups, consumer applications, civil industrial applications, and public-sector applications.
The same day, the White House issued Section 232 action on processed critical minerals and derivative products. That action focused on reducing strategic dependence on imported processed minerals and strengthening domestic supply-chain resilience.
February 2026 was the turning point for the tariff landscape. On February 20, the Supreme Court held that IEEPA does not authorize the President to impose tariffs. The White House then issued an executive order ending certain IEEPA-based additional ad valorem duties and directed agencies to stop collecting them as soon as practicable.
The same day, the administration issued a separate proclamation under Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974. That proclamation imposed a temporary 10% import surcharge effective February 24, 2026. The surcharge may remain in place for 150 days unless modified, suspended, or extended by Congress.
This created a new structure: IEEPA tariff duties ended, but a temporary Section 122 surcharge replaced part of the broad tariff framework while sector-specific tariffs under Section 232 and trade-practice actions under Section 301 continued separately.
On March 11, 2026, USTR initiated Section 301 investigations into structural excess capacity and production in manufacturing sectors. The investigations covered China, the European Union, Singapore, Switzerland, Norway, Indonesia, Malaysia, Cambodia, Thailand, Korea, Vietnam, Taiwan, Bangladesh, Mexico, Japan, and India.
On March 12, 2026, USTR initiated 60 Section 301 investigations into whether economies failed to impose or effectively enforce bans on goods produced with forced labor.
On March 13, 2026, the United States and Ecuador signed the Agreement on Reciprocal Trade. USTR published both the agreement text and tariff schedule.
On April 2, 2026, the White House strengthened and adjusted Section 232 tariffs on aluminum, steel, copper, and derivative products. The update also clarified scope issues, including treatment for products containing 15% or less steel, aluminum, or copper.
The same day, the White House imposed Section 232 tariffs on patented pharmaceuticals and associated pharmaceutical ingredients. Covered products face a 100% ad valorem duty unless a listed exclusion, zero-tariff category, company agreement, or other relief applies.
On June 1, 2026, the White House further adjusted tariff treatment for aluminum, steel, and copper imports. These changes included temporary measures through December 31, 2027 and reduced-duty treatment for certain capital equipment using high levels of U.S.-origin steel or aluminum.
Also on June 1, USTR issued a Section 301 determination involving Brazil and proposed responsive action.
On June 2, USTR made findings and proposed action in the 60 forced-labor Section 301 investigations. The proposed action included additional duties of 10% for some economies and 12.5% for others, plus a proposed textile mechanism.
On July 1, 2026, the United States, Mexico, and Canada held the USMCA joint review. USTR stated that the United States did not agree to renew the agreement in its current form, which adds uncertainty for North American supply chains.
On July 2, USTR announced public hearings for the forced-labor Section 301 proposed action, scheduled for July 7–9, 2026.
Steel and aluminum remain among the most exposed sectors under the current tariff framework. Tariffs returned to 25% in March 2025, increased to 50% in June 2025, and were later adjusted through 2026 actions covering derivative products and country- or content-based treatment.
Importers of metal products should review product classification, derivative content, country of origin, U.S.-origin metal content, and whether the product qualifies for reduced treatment. The 2026 adjustments create opportunities for some capital equipment, but they also increase compliance complexity.
Automobiles and auto parts remain exposed to Section 232 measures. A 25% tariff on covered autos and parts continues to affect importers, while North American production may benefit from USMCA-origin treatment when rules of origin are satisfied.
The July 2026 USMCA review adds a new layer of uncertainty. Automotive companies, parts suppliers, and logistics providers should monitor whether rules of origin, tariff treatment, and regional content requirements change during the review process.
Medium- and heavy-duty trucks, key truck parts, and buses are subject to Section 232 tariffs. Covered medium- and heavy-duty trucks and key parts face 25% duties, while buses face 10% duties.
These measures affect fleet operators, dealers, truck manufacturers, logistics companies, construction firms, and public transport procurement. U.S.-assembled trucks and engines may receive tariff-credit or offset treatment through October 31, 2030.
Copper tariffs affect electrical equipment, electronics, cables, renewable energy systems, batteries, power infrastructure, and construction materials. The June 2026 metals update added further complexity by adjusting tariff treatment for aluminum, steel, and copper imports.
Electronics importers also face semiconductor-related uncertainty. The January 2026 Section 232 semiconductor action includes targeted duties on certain advanced computing chips and derivative products, while late-2025 China semiconductor actions and delayed tariff increases remain relevant.
Semiconductors, semiconductor manufacturing equipment, and derivative products are now part of the Section 232 framework. The January 2026 action created targeted duties but also included exclusions for important uses such as U.S. data centers, repairs, R&D, startups, non-data center consumer applications, civil industrial use, and public-sector use.
For technology companies, data-center operators, electronics manufacturers, and importers of advanced machinery, the key issue is not only the duty rate but whether the imported product falls within a covered classification and whether an exclusion applies.
The April 2026 Section 232 action on patented pharmaceuticals and associated pharmaceutical ingredients created one of the highest sector-specific tariff rates in the current framework. Covered products face a 100% duty unless a listed exclusion, company-specific agreement, or zero-tariff category applies.
This affects pharmaceutical companies, healthcare distributors, importers of active ingredients, and supply-chain teams managing production localization or U.S. manufacturing commitments.
Agriculture and food imports saw a partial easing in late 2025 when more than 200 agricultural and staple-food products were removed from reciprocal tariff treatment. Brazil-related agriculture tariffs were also rolled back in November 2025.
However, the end of IEEPA tariff duties and the shift to Section 122 do not remove all agricultural tariff risk. Country-specific negotiations, Section 301 investigations, and sector measures can still affect food, beverage, fertilizer, and agricultural input costs.
The end of de minimis treatment remains one of the biggest operational changes for cross-border e-commerce. Low-value shipments that previously entered duty-free now require customs processing and payment of applicable duties.
This affects marketplaces, direct-to-consumer brands, parcel consolidators, postal operators, express carriers, and fulfillment providers. Businesses need better HS classification, declared value accuracy, country-of-origin tracking, and duty calculation before checkout.
China-linked ship-to-shore cranes, chassis, and cargo-handling equipment remain important risk areas because of Section 301 port-security measures and later suspensions. Even where duties or port fees are suspended, procurement decisions remain affected by tariff uncertainty.
Ports, terminals, and logistics infrastructure operators should evaluate sourcing, financing, spare parts, maintenance schedules, and procurement timing before committing to major capital equipment orders.
The 60 Section 301 forced-labor investigations may create new duty exposure for apparel, textiles, and other goods linked to economies that USTR says failed to enforce forced-labor import bans.
The proposed textile mechanism could allow some apparel and textile imports from certain economies to enter at a reduced Section 301 tariff rate, but the details remain subject to the final action. Importers should review supplier mapping, forced-labor compliance, product origin, and documentation practices.
The central legal issue changed in February 2026. Before then, the major question was whether IEEPA gave the President authority to impose broad tariffs. The Supreme Court answered that question by holding that IEEPA does not authorize the President to impose tariffs.
As a result, the broad reciprocal, fentanyl-related, Brazil, Cuba, Iran, Russia-related, and other IEEPA-based additional ad valorem duties were ordered to end. Agencies were directed to stop collecting those duties as soon as practicable.
However, the decision did not eliminate the broader tariff agenda. Other authorities remain available:
Politically, Congress is also more active. Senate votes challenging tariff actions, USMCA review pressure, and stakeholder comments in Section 301 proceedings all show that tariff policy is no longer only an executive-branch issue.
For businesses, the practical result is a more fragmented tariff environment. One broad emergency tariff structure has ended, but multiple product-specific, country-specific, and sector-specific measures remain active.
The 2025–2026 U.S. tariff landscape has moved from broad IEEPA emergency tariffs toward a more complex mix of Section 122, Section 232, Section 301, de minimis enforcement, and trade-agreement negotiations.
For supply-chain teams, the safest approach is no longer to monitor only headline tariff rates. Companies should track the legal authority behind each measure, whether the action is final or proposed, whether exclusions apply, and whether the tariff stacks with other duties. Tariff exposure in 2026 is now a compliance, sourcing, pricing, and logistics-planning issue at the same time.
Related Articles